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PREFACE
The work described in this report was performed by
the Mariner Jupiter/Saturn 1977 Project.
Thirty years of applying the systems approach have
given us some understanding of its capabilities and
limitations.
This report is based on a lecture series sponsored
by the California Institute of Technoloqy and
published in SYSTEMS CONCEPTS: LECTURES ON CONTEM-
PORARY APPROACHES TO SYSTEMS, Edited by Ralph F.
Miles, Jr., John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973.
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"A Contemporary View of Systems Engineering"
by Ralph F. Miles, Jr.
ABSTRACT
This article defines the concept of a "system," discusses
the "systems approach," and presents four contemporary
examples of the systems approach. It is a condensation
and summary of a 1971 lecture series sponsored by the
F	 California Institute of Technology and published in
t
Systems Concepts: Lectures on Contemporary Approacnes
to Systems, edited by Ralph F. Miles, Jr., John Wiley,
1973.
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Introduction
While the exact origins of systems engineeriny as a discipline are
somewhat obscure, at least three distinct activities contributed to its initial
conceptual development. In the years just prior to World War 11, companies in
the commnications industry, such as the Bell Telephone Laboratories and the
Radio Corporation of America, recognized that the pro per design and operation
of telephone and television services would require that these services be
considered as total systems rather than as assemblages of components. During
World War II, scientists working on the problems of war operations developed
the methodology of what came to be known as Operations Research. By the end
of World War II, the Armed Forces realized that the increasing technical cos ►-
plexity of military equipment would require new approaches to their management,
design, and operation. Since that time, systems engineering has become the
sine _% a non for the development of all military, communication, and aerospace
systems.
The Definition of a System
Most definitions of "system" include the concept of a collection of
elements and a set of interrelationships between the elements. To the extent
that the definition focuses on the totality of the interrelationships and not
on the elements per se, "system" is synonymous with the psychologist's "gestalt,"
and emphasizes the idea that a system is a conceptual entity apart from the
mere summation of its elements.
Systems engineering is primarily concerned with the creation and operation
of systems. The main theme of systems engineering is that the system exists for
a purpose, and that the elements of the system are created and interrelated as
a means of achieving this purpose. Within this context a more restrictive
definition of "system" is appropriate.
"A systea is a set of interrelated elements which function for
a purpose."
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Even this definition is somewhat too general, for systems engineering is
hardly appropriate to, for example, a respiratory system or an automobile
ignition system. Thus other restrictions need to be invoked in order to limit
the class of systems to be considered. Robert Macho], Professor of System!,
at Northwestern University, considers systems relevant to systems engineering
to have some, but not necessarily all, of the followiny properties:
*	 The system is man-made.
*	 The system has integrity--all components contribute to a common
purpose, the production of a set of optimum outputs from the
given inputs.
* The system is large--in number of different parts, in replication
of identical parts, perhaps in functions performed, and certainly
in cost.
*	 The system is complex, which means that a change in one variable
will affect many other variables in the system, rarely in a simple
manner.
* The system is semiautomatic with a man-machine interface, which
means that machines always perform some of the functions of the
system and human beings always perform other functions.
*	 Some of the system inputs are random, which leads to an inability
to predict the exact performance of the system at any instant.
There is no generally accepted definition which will separate systems
from nonsystems. A system, much like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder.
A decade ago, the title of "system," within the context presented here, was
usually construed to apply only to technical systems, but today the term has
been extended to civil and social systems. Simon Ramo, Vice Chairman of the
2	 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-667
Board and Chairman of the Execrative Committee of 'TRW Inc., argues that a city
is a system, whether or not we choose to re,ard it in that light. He says
if we choose not to, then it till simply 5e a bad system.
It is now common to mak a di s t 4 ncti on between technical systems and
civil or social systems. While thr distinction is by no means clear-cut,
technical systems tend to brr more related to hardware elements and to have
objectives related to the parfr,rmance of the hardware elements. Robert Boguslaw,
Professor of Sociology at Wasnington University, defines i social system not
in ^!Rrms of the relative proportion or !roles played by t►umans in the system,
but in the degree to whi6i the system objectives are related to social welfare.
In this 1 'erarchy of deJ, initions, civil systems would lie somewhere between
technica, and social ;ystens.
The difficulties of precisely defining a system, the system boundaries,
and the system objectives--even for a technical system--can best be illustrated
by the followirg example. A Boeing 747 jet airplane may be coric liered to be
a technical subsystem of a transportation system. The complete transportation
system must also include the personnel--pilots, stewardesses, ground crews.
There must also be a reservation system, airports, communications, navigational
aids, anr, an air trzffic control system.
Tn addition to the organizations required to manage and operate these
systems, there must also be other organizations concerned with the overall
resources invested and the overall return obtained. At one level this involves
Vie stockholders and the management of the airline. At a higher level it
'involves the national government or a consortium of governments. It is they
who must provide the overall objectives and decision criteria f-5r the system
and make the difficult trade-offs between public and private investment,
convenience versus efficiency of operation, user versus nonuser considerations,
and profit versus safety and reliability.
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3Thus what started off to be a straightforward technical system with
seemingly well defined interfaces, on closer inspection becomes a subsystem
threaded through many larger systems, with system objectives so complex that
there are limited prospects of realizing complete answers to questions as
fundamental as, "Do the benefits equal the resources expended?"
Systems Engineering with the Systems Approach
Systems have been engineered in one fashion or another for millennia.
Systems engineering today represents more of a change in emphasis than a change
in content--more emphasis on defining goals and relating systems performance
to these goals, more emphasis on decision criteria, on developing alternatives,
on modeling systems for analysis, and on controlling implementation and operation.
Systems engineering focuses on achieving objectives, and it attempts to
achieve these objectives through a logical, structured approach called the
"systems approach." The systems approach brings together the rigorous thinking
of science and a number of common-sense ideas related to problem-solving and
design. The systems approach starts with the notion of a system composed of
a number of elements which function in an interrelated manner. The system
is viewed as existing in an environment uncontrolled by the system, but which
nevertheless influences its behavior. Invariably, the system itself can be
viewed as an element of some larger system.
The system is con y i Tiered to have a goal or objectives, and the system is
optimized at the system level to achieve these objectives. The functions
t	 assigned to the various system elements and the selection and operation of
{
	
	
the system elements should reflect this philosophy of system optimization.
This may well mean that some elements of the system are operated in other than
their most efficient manner.
The systems approach assumes that alternatives potentially exist for the
system. These alternatives must be developed, they must be understood, and
4	 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-667
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that system alternative should be selected which "best" satisfies the objectives
of the system.
Finally, the systems approach advocates a logical approach to thinking
about the system. The methodologies and philosophy of science are to oe used
in formulating the system objectives, in the development and analysis of
alternatives, and in the process by which the system alternative is selected
and implemented. This implies an intellectual precision not normally associated
pith "nonscientific" enterprises.
The systems approach is an extension of problem-salving methods of the
kind that John Dewey posed when he asked, "What is the problem? What are the
al • ernatives? Which alternative is best?" This theme is present in the steps
tv the systems approach, which are typically presented as:
1. Statement of system objectives.
2. Synthesis of alternative systems.
3. Analysis of alternative systems.
4. Selection from the alternative systems.
5. Implementation of the selected system.
Statement. The first step of the system; approach--to state the system
objectives--is not at all an easy one. Even though the system objectives may
have begin derived from broadly relevant goals, they nPvertheless must be stated
in sufficient detail so as to permit evaluation and selection between system
alternatives. The most important systems--the very large ones--must somehow
relate to national goals, which are often elusive and controversial. 	 The
formulation of the system objectives deserves an analysis in and of itself.
For the system objectives, implicitly if not explicitly, determine the boundaries
of the system, the range of system alternatives potentially admissible, and
the criteria of optimality to be used in all the analyses that follow.
Synthesis. The second step is a creative process: To synthesize system
alternatives--not just one, but a range of alternatives--from which a selection
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-667
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can be made. It is possible to devise new system alternatives by analyzing
existing systems. New combinations of the elements of existing systems may
yield potential alternatives. Beyond this, no technique presently exists for
the creation of totally new alternatives. It is unfortunate that this step,
which embodies the essence of invention, is so little understood and that so
little can be said about it.
Clearly the systems approach, when applied to a set of poor alternatives,
no matter how sophisticated and clever the analysis, can only yield a poor
solution. Henry Rowen, Professor of Public Management at Stanford University
and former President of The Rand Corporation, makes the point that many problems
appear, and are, intractable if viewed statically. But new inventions, both
technical and social, can make a difference. They introduce a new set of
alternatives which may help--not necessarily by providing complete solutions,
for new inventions create new problems, but by ameliorating and resolving old
problems.
Analysis. The third step involves analysis. Given the system alternatives
and given the stated objectives, develop an understanding of the alternatives
ind the degree to which they satisfy the objectives. The preponderance of
literature which exists on systems engineering is primarily concerned with this
step and the appropriate analysis techniques. These analysis techniques can
be applied, in very sophisticated ways, whenever the system objectives and the
system parameters can be quantified.
For this systems analysis, in addition to the classical mathematical
methods, techniques have been developed specifically for large scale systems.
Queuing theory and systems simulation techniques have been developed by the
M.I.T. Operations Research Center under the leadership of Philip Morse. The
"simplex" method for the solution of linear programming problems was developed
by George Dantzig and his associates for modeling resource allocation problems
for the U.S. Air Force. Dynamic programming was originally developed by
Richard Bellm:an in the early 1950's at RAND as a tool for analyzing multistage
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decision processes. PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique) was developed
by the U.S. Navy as a technique for preparing program schedules, and for assessing
the progress of the program with respect to the schedules.
Unfortunately it is not always possible to quantify the system objectives
and the system parameters, and in fact for the most important systems it is
never possible to quantify all the objectives. In spite of this obstacle--the
apparently nonquantifiable nature of the total system--analysis to the extent
it can be accomplished is nearly always beneficial. At least it will indicate
the preferred alternatives if the decision maker were to consider only the
quantifiable aspects.
Selection. The fourth step is selection. The results of the analysis are
used to determine which alternative is "best" in terms of the criteria the
systems designer has selected to represent the overall measure of optimality
of the system. Because the analysis is incomplete in that it rarely includes
all the considerations, the decision maker must use his subjective judgment
in assessing the relative importance of the nonquantifiable aspects of the
decision in the selection of the "best" system.
To the extent that the decision can be quantified, the techniques of
"decision analysis" can be used to select between system alternatives. Decision
analysis identifies the optimum alternative by combining the systems analysis
of the preceeding step with the value structure, risk preference, and time
preference of the decision maker. Decision analysis also provides a means of
communication that aids the separation of issues from nonissues (through the
use of systems models to identity and structure the relevant parts of the
decision), facts from fiction (through the use of probability theory to encode
uncertainty), and value judgment from technical description (through the use
of utility theory to encode values) .
Two studies performed recently by Ronald Howard of Stanford University
and James Matheson and his associates at the Stanford Research Institute
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-667 	 7
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illustrate the magnitude of complexity and uncertainty that can be addressed
with decision analysis.	 The first study was undertaken for the Mexican govern-
ment and concerned the future expansion of the Mexican electrical power system.
The study specifically addressed the question of whether nuclear power plants
should be installed in Mexico and, if so, how they should be phased into the
electrical system, and how they should be operated and priced.	 Since any
decision of this magnitude would obviously affect the entire Mexican economy,
it was necessary to develop a comprehensive model including not only the outputs
that would appear on the balance sheet of a corporation, but also social outputs
such as the benefits to Mexican industry, the creation of new public works,
the dependence on foreign supply, and the environmental implications.
The second study was undertaken for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
} Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce, and focused on the decision
{ problems inherent in hurricane modification by seeding with silver iodide.
The study addressed the policy decision concerning the present prohibition
against seeding hurricanes threatening coastal areas.	 It also examined the
fi
value of expanding research in hurricane modification.
Implementation.	 The fifth and last step is implementation, in which the
selected system is brought into being. 	 This final step is the critical step,
x in that the foregoing steps are only an intellectual exercise unless this final
step can be realized.	 C. West Churchman, Professor of Business Administration}
at the University of California, Berkeley, says that with respect to the design
of organizations, implementation is the most important and difficult step--that
what has come before is minor compared to the problem of changing an organiza-
tion in the light of analysis.
Although the steps to the systems approach appear in a logical progression,
it should not be inferred that these steps occur this simply in practice.
There is a paradox in the design of large systems.	 The requirements for a
large system can never be fully understood until the system has been completely
designed, yet the system cannot be completely designed until the requirements
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iare fully understood. Thus the design of a larg- system is extremely iterative,
with the systems design proceeding from requirements to systems to requirements
and so on, with each iteration in principle producing a more optimized and
detailed design.
Four Contemporary Systems
With this discussion of "systems" and the "systems approach," four
contemporary systems will now be examined to understand how the systems approach
was applied and what success resulted. These systems illustrate the systems
approach in that they are goal-oriented (designed to meet stated requirements),
three of the four examples explicitly display the steps to the systems approach,
and all of them represent systems optimized at the systemstems level.
Example #1: Aerospace Programs
Aerospace programs represent the pinnacle of achievement for the systems
engineering of technical systems. For these programs, the systems approach
is evident in the chronological phases of definition, design, implementation,
and operation. The definition phase involves an analysis of the requirements
and selection criteria, a generation at the systems level of a range of feasible
alternatives, and an analysis of the best alternatives. The conclusion of
the definition phase comes with the selection of one systems alternative, and
with a gross understanding of the implications of the selected alternative
with respect to performance, cost, schedule, risk, required technology develop-
ment, system lifetime, and interfaces with other systems.
The design phase starts with the product of the definition phase, a grossly
defined system, and proceeds to define, design, and analyze the system down
to the level such that all documentation exists for the complete creation of
the system. The implementation phase brings the system into being. This phase
includes the procurement of parts and materials, fabrication and assembly of
hardware, coding and validaticr. of computer software, and training of personnel.
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-661
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The implementation phase ends with the system level tests or review processes
which are required to certify the system for operation. The operations phase
starts with the first application of the system to its stated purpose and
continues through to the final phase-out of the system at the end of the life-
cycle.
For the purposes of both management and engineering control, these
programs are divided into major systems, the systems into subsystems, and
so forth. The successful Mariner Projects, managed by the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory for NASA, have typically been divided into four or five major
systems. A "matrix" organization structure is often used to focus and integrate
these management and engineering efforts. The classical organization chart
with vertically aligned functional divisions is overlaid with horizontally
aligned programs which intersect the division structure.
Most of these aerospace programs function in an environment of organ-
izational elements partially dedicated to other programs, and with systems
which compete for the program resources. Thus a program office is required
for these programs to exist as viable and recognizable entities, and for the
optimization process to occur at the program level. A program manager is
assigned to provide a management interface with the higher-level organizations,
to provide direction to the program systems and to the committed organizational
elements, to assess the current program status, and to determine the degree
to which the program objectives a re consistent with the program resources.
The program manager has a staff woich carries out the management of the program
resources, which participates in the trade-off decisions between competing
or conflicting requirements of the program systems, and which performs the
analyses of the program status with respect to the scheduled milestones, the
performance and reliability estimates, and the present costs incurred and
future costs predicted out to the program completion.
Where these aerospace programs have been successful, they have succeeded
because the necessary technology existed or could be brought into being, the
10
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design was well thought out and had been extensively analyzed, the required
reliability was obtained through meticulous attention to detail and thorough
testing, and sufficient visibility was attained to allow the program management
to make the necessary decisions and to implement corrective action when problems
were encountered.
In addition, those programs which were highly innovative required a fair
measure of good fortune to succeed.
	 George Mueller, Associate Administrator
t	 1
for Manned Space Flight for NASA from 1963 through 1969, lists a number of
== problem areas on the Apollo Program where the required technology was undeveloped
or the risks were unknown:	 space radiation hazards, meteoroid hazards, the
unknown lunar surface environment, the design of large launch vehicles, and
the techniques for orbital rendevous.	 Roe success of Apollo depended critically
on the appropriate resolution of every one of these problem areas.
f
h=	 Example #2: An Operations Research Project
Operations Research is an experimental and applied science devoted to
t observing, understanding, and predicting the behavior of purposeful man machine
systems. C. Test Churchman and his associates have proposed the fallowing
definition: "Operations Research is the application of scientific methods,
techniques and tools to problems involving the operations of a system so as
to provide those in control of the system with optimum solutions to the problems."
The essential aspects of Operations Research are its system or organization
orientation, the use of interdisciplinary teams, and its scientific approach4
to the solution of problems. Over the past thirty years, the methods of
-_	 Operations Research have been applied to a wide range of systems problems in
industrial, military, and government organizations.
The stages of an Operations Research project parallel the stages of the
systems approach:
1. Formulating the problem.
2. Constructing the model.
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3. Deriving a solution.
4. Testing the model and evaluating the solution.
5. Implementing and maintaining the solution.
A recent Operations Research project was undertaken by John Jennings and
the M.I.T. Operations Research Center to improve the blood bank inventory
system for hospitals in the Boston area. The following description illustrates
each of the stages of an Operations Research project.
FoPvuLATING THE PROBLEM. whole blood cannot be kept longer than 28 days;
after that time it must be processed into its various components. Here a
balance must be made between the chance of not having blood of a given type
on hand (shortage probability) and the chance of having the blood become
useless because it is too old (outdating probability) while some other hospital
is short of the same blood.
Most of the major hospitals in the Boston area collected about one-half
s	 of the blood supply they used, and stored it themselves. Since the smaller
the system the larger the relative fluctuations, this arrangement produced
z	 frequent glut and famine. Often one hospital would be out of blood of one
type while others had to outdate some of their supply. Clearly a more unified
organization could reduce outdating as well as shortages. The crucial questions
were: what would it cost, what sort of operating rules were required, and
how much would be the expected reduction in outdating and shortage?
CONSTRUCTING THE MODEL. The Massachusetts Red Cross Blood Center was
the organization with the potential for setting up the cooperative system.
It was already supplying nearly one-half of the whole blood used by-the hospitals
and, with its bloodmobiles, it could handle the necessary transportation as
well as the central storage required by a unified system.
The first task was to gather data on average use, statistics of fluctu-
ations, present rules of operation, and opinions of the various operating
personnel. On the basis of these data and mathematical models from queuing
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theory, a computer program was constructed to simulate a central bank plus
cooperating hospitals, each with its own inventory. 	 The simulation program
included the fluctuations above and below each hospital ' s estimate of the next
week ' s demand, delays and costs of transporting blood between hospitals or
from the Center, as well as the flexibility Ui try out various rules of operation.
DERIVING A SOLUTION. 	 Several different sets of rules were tried out:
daily or weekly readjustment of all stocks, or a system whereby stocks of
z different ages would be kept at predetermined levels, with replenishment
shipments provided on request from the Center or from other hospitals with
R oversuppiies of older blood.	 The simulation soon demonstrated that daily
i readjustment involved excessive transportation costs and weekly readjustment
did not sufficiently reduce outdating and shortages. 	 The more flexible system
of replenishment-as-needed (according to a set of stock rules) did not cost
i too much for transportation and gave promise of a reduction in loss.d
} The individual hospital stock rules determined the balance between the
I
probabilities of shortage and of outdating, and this balance had to be decided
i^
by a consensus of opinion of-he hospital staffs. 	 The decision was to make
1 the chance of outdating equal the chance of shortage for each type of blood.
2
TESTING THE WDEL AND EVALUATING THE SOLUTION.	 The details of all parts
of the operation had to be known- -what actually happened, not what one hoped
f would happen--before the simulation could be trusted to give correct predictions.
-4- In the case of the blood banks, stock rules were tried out at individual
hospitals to see whether those elements went as predicted, before the system
as a whole was adopted. 	 With these rules the simulation predicted that with
a system of five hospitals and the Center, both outdating and shortages could
be reduced to about one-half the values experienced with the system ( or lack
of system) then in practice.
IMPLMENTING AND MAINTAINING THE SOLUTION. This blood bank inventory
system was installed and has been in operation for several years. The
JRL Technical Memorandum 33-661
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conmunication and clerical costs for keeping the r-quisi a records have been
reasonable, and the savings in blood predicted by the simulation have been
achieved. The operation has proved to be satisfactory to all the participating
organizations.
Example #3: The Planning-Programming-Budgetingting stem
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) has been used by the
Department of Defense since 1961 and was generally adopted by the feaeral
government in 1965. PPBS is an approach to government decision making
designed to make as explicit as possible the costs and consequences of major
program alternatives and to encourage the use of this information systematically
in the making of public policy. PPBS has its origins in engineering through
:
	 the design of complex systems, in economics through the development of cost-
k	
benefit techniques of analysis, and in public administration and business
through the development of program budgeting.
Its essential aspe;,^s parallel the steps of the systems approach:
f
t
*	 A careful specification and a systematic analysis of the objectives.
t	 *	 A search for the relevant alternatives, the different ways of
achieving the objectives.
i
*	 Ar, estimate of the total costs of each alternative--both direct and
indirect costs, both initial costs and those to which the alternative
commits future years, both dollar costs and those costs that cannot
.	 be measured in dollar terms.
*	 An estimate of the effectiveness of each alternative, of how close
{	 it comes to satisfying the various objectives.
i
A comparison and analysis of the alternatives, seeking that
combination of alternatives that promises the greatest effectiveness,
for given resources, in achieving the objectives.
14	 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-667
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The component parts of PPBS which the government used during the late
1960's were: (1) Program structures, which display each agency's physical
and financial activities according to objective or common outputs; (2) issue
letters, which summarize the agency's and the Office of Management and Budget's
list of major policy issues in need of analysis and evaluation during each
planning and budgeting cycle, and special analytic studies, which reflect
intensive analysis of these issues; (3) program memoranda, which register
agency choices between alternatives and summarize relevant analysis affecting
the decisions; and (4) program and financial1p ans, which display for the past
two and for the next five years data on the financial i nputs and physical
outputs resulting from proposed and past commitments.
A number of problems have inhibited the application of PPBS in government
agencies. The discretionary part of an agency's budget in any given year is
small because prior year deC ► rions have committed most of the resources
currently available. There is also the problem of cutting beck on obsolete
programs that might have made sense when they were started, but long since
have lost their usefulness. Another difficulty is that many public issues
and programs are very hard to evaluate. There is the complicated business
of estimating the costs and benefits not just in the aggregate, but to different
groups and individuals. Finally, the responsible agencies frequently do not.
have much incentive to apply analysis techniques even when they are available.
For one thing the results might be unfavorable to that agency or its programs.
In spite of these problems, significant improvements have resulted. Many
agencies have undergone at least a partial reappraisal of their functions and
missions. Some improvement in ways of displaying related programs in several
agencies has been made. The quality, relevance, and structure of information
being developed by the agencies has improved substantially, and is being used
increasingly to assist decision makers. There is also a general recognition
of the legitimacy and necessity of analytical arguments--that good judgment
is made even better when it can be supported by good analysis.
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-661
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For these reasons, at least some aspects of PPBS now appear to be a
permanent part of the government decision-making process. The government will
probably continue the special analytic studies, and it will retain some type
of a program budget, one, for example, which could show how much health care
is provided in the aggregate from all the federal agencies.
Example #4: An Information Processing System
rt	 This example concerns the Probabilistic Information Processing System
(PIP) developed by Ward Edwards and his associates at The Diversity of Michigan.
PIP is a system which can be used in decision-making situations where a large
amount of inconclusive data is present. This could involve a military or
political strategist interpreting intelligence data, a medical diagnosis, or
even forecasting weather. PIP is especially appropriate where the situation
is of sufficient complexity that a computer model of the data generating process
cannot be developed, yet the data are too voluminous and inconclusive to be
easily assimilated by a man.
PIP uses men and computers in a novel way to perform diagnostic information
processing. PIP allows experts to judge the diagnostic implications of a single
A	 datum, something that men do quite well. The individual diagnoses are then
aggregated in a computer by means of a formal rule of probability theory known
as Bayes's Theorem. Bayes's Theorem, in an appropriate form, says that the
odds that some Hypothesis is true based on a single datum is:
f	 Posterior	 _	 Likelihood	 Prior
n	 Odds
	
Ratio	 Odds
where the "prior odds" are the odds before the datum is considered; the
"posterior odds" are the odds after the datum has been considered; and the
"likelihood ratio" is the probability that the datum would be ubserved given
s that the hypothesis is true, divided by the probability that the datum would
be observed given that the hypothesis is not true.
16	 JPL Technical Memorandum 33-667
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In PIP, men estimate likelihood ratios for each datum and each hypothesis
under consideration. A computer aggregates these estimates by means of Bayes's
Theorem into posterior odds that reflect the impact of all available data
on all hypotheses being considered. Such a system circumvents human conservatism
in information processing, the inability of men to aggregate information in
su^h a way as to modify their opinions as much as the available data justify.
It also fragments the job of evaluating diagnostic information into small
separable tasks. The posterior odds that are a PIP's output may be used as
a guide to human decision-making or may be combined with a payoff matrix to
make decisions by means of some rule for maximizing expected value.
.,-
PIP illustrates the concept of optimizing a system by using the system
components--in this case men and computers--in the most o effective manner to_
perfor-ai the system tasks. 	 PIP has been used to predict the length of a stay
in a hospital after an operation, to diagnose thyroid diseases, to predicti
.^ recidivism in juvenile delinquents, and in retrospect to reprocess data
from the Cuban missile crisis and the Chinese intervention after the Inchon
i
Landing in North Korea.
	
In all of these cases, PIP appears to be an improvement
over systems which require man to aggregate the data, in that PIP requires
less data to perform an equivalent diagnosis.
Conclusion
t
} These four systems illustrate the systems approach as it is applied to
X -	 _ the design of systems today.	 That it can work very well is both a source of
satisfaction and a source of frustration.	 The systems approach is a source
f of satisfaction as an intellectual achievement in that we appear to possess
z=_ the managerial and engineering ability to accomplish any task, however large,
y which is technically feasible.
	
The systems approach is also a source of
frustration (If we can send a man to the moon, why can ' t we ...?), in that
our ability to accomplish these incredible technical feats seems inconsistent
'-_ with our inability to accomplish tasks of seemingly lesser difficulty.
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rWi l l i an Pickering, Director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California
Institute of Technology, states four requirements on a project for it to be
amenable to the systems approach: (1) The project objectives must be clearly
defined; (2) The project constraints--this includes legal and political con-
straints as well as cost and schedule--must be understood; (3) The project
management structure and authority must be recognized; (4) The project must
be implemented by competent personnel with available technologies.
Kr
	
	 These requirements, while directly applicable to most technical systems,
rarely can be satisfied in the case of social system problems. Not only is
it extremely difficult to state the goals of most social systems, the techniques
for understanding and analyzing the social alternatives need much further
development.
Harold Brown, President of the California Institute of Technology, believes
that systems engineering is a necessity for the optimal solution of today's
technological problems. He warns that systems engineering by itself will not
be enough to solve the far more complicated social and economic problems that
advanced societies face today. Much more must be known about the components
of the socioeconomic problems--the people and the human institutions--to be
{
	
	
aFle to have much confidence in the results of systems engineering approaches
co such problems at the present time. Thus he concludes that systems engineer-
ing today is a necessary, but not a sufficient, factor for the solutions to
the current problems of society. The decisions and conclusions in nontechno-
logical areas will have to be reached largely through the exercise of subjective
judgment and experience. Nevertheless, those judgments, however experienced
and able, may be made on the basis of faulty data and poor comparisons unless
4
the facts are presented and evaluated and all alternatives exposed through
the methods of systems engineering.
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